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Wemodel asimple justicesystemin whichacourt ismandatedby societytoassessthe guilt andthe
punishment of an accused. The court takes prison facilities as given and neglects its impact on the
cost to society of implementing the sentence. Clearly, the court, in this world, will condemn more
often than society and assign higher penalties. Under these circumstances, society at large would
necessarily beneﬁt from having maximum sentences. We show, however, as a series of perverse
results, that (1) maximum penalties need to be lower than the highest socially desirable penalty;
(2) society would beneﬁt from imposing high minimum sentences even though it is precisely the
harshness of courts, which it wants to curb.
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JEL classiﬁcation: K41,K141 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to ﬁnd a rationale for the existence of maximum as well as minimum
penalties associated with speciﬁc crimes. Though in most democracies, the duty of pronouncing
the guilt or the innocence of a citizen is left to a court, it is also true that society limits sanctions,
thereby suggesting that it does not entirely trust the court’s choices.
Clearly, for society to restrict the behavior of courts, it must be that courts tend to sentence differ-
ently than would be socially desirable. In particular, if courts tend to be more severe than society,
imposing maximum and minimum sentences might help align their decisions with the social op-
timum. Courts would indeed be more severe than society if, when choosing the sentence, they
neglect the social cost of this sentence. We argue that this is very likely. In particular, we argue
that the social cost of penalties is an externality.
This is equivalent to the following two assumptions: First, a court, when assigning a penalty be-
lieves its impact on the social cost of sentences is nil or very small. We believe this is a reasonable
assumption. Indeed, when choosing a penalty, the court takes prison facilities as given. Because
of the essentially ﬁxed nature of the cost of prisons, the cost of sending one more person to jail
is negligible with respect to overall cost of sentences. Hence, the court is likely to ignore that
cost. Clearly, however, society does care about the ﬁxed cost. Second, a court, when making its
judgment, believes it has no impact on the choice of other courts. The court focuses on one case,
whereas society at large deals with many cases. Society might be willing to make some cost arbi-
trage between cases, which courts are not capable of. For these reasons, the objectives of society
and a given court will not typically lead to the same choice of penalty.
In this paper we show that it is socially optimal to restrict courts behavior by imposing not only a
maximum sentence, but also a minimum sentence. Moreover, we show that the maximum sentence
ought to be lower than the highest socially optimal penalty. Those results are somewhat perverse.
A society unhappy with its courts, imposing too often penalties that are socially too high, might
manage to refrain courts from doing so by setting a high minimum penalty and a low maximum
one. The role of the minimum penalty is very important: with a minimum penalty, courts might
decide to acquit those accused that society would not have convicted.
These limits to sentences, while helping society contain the cost of sentences, tend to make it easier
for criminals. In an interesting article on the pattern of crime in 17th and 18th centuries England,
Beattie (1974) provides an extreme example of the effects of minimum sentences. The author
1reports that in 1689 an estimate of 50 crimes, many of which petty crimes, were by law assigned
the death penalty. This number was increased to 200 by the end of the 18th century. Beattie (1974)
documents evidence that the increased harshness of the criminal code led courts to either dismiss
cases for which there was sufﬁcient evidence to condemn but the penalty was perceived to be too
strong, or to underplay the description of some crimes in order to save petty criminals from capital
punishment. In a more recent example, DiIulio (1996) states:
Where “three strikes” laws have taken effect, prosecutors have begun to exercise their
discretion in bringing charges in ways that spare many thrice-convicted violent felons
one-way tickets to the big house. [DiIulio, page 9]
These examples of penalties clearly exceed the severity of the minimum penalty we advocate as
optimal for society. But they illustrate nicely the mechanisms by which minimum penalties may
end up reducing convictions. It is precisely because the minimum penalty is perceived to be too
high for the case at hand that some accused are not penalized.
There exists a very rich literature on the optimal size of sentences, initiated by the seminal research
by Becker (1968). The sense of optimality of a sentence in this literature is directed towards the
deterrence of criminal behavior. Becker showed that the optimal deterrent was often a uniformly
high penalty. When taking into account the principle of reasonable doubt that forms the basis of
the US justice system, Andreoni (1991) established that the optimal deterrent was rather a penalty
growingwith the levelof the offence. Using a similar reasoning, Rasmusen (1995) illustrated cases
under which the penalty is not a continuous function of the level of harm.
Our emphasis is quite different. Though in our model preferences could be interpreted as resulting
from the deterrence incentive, our main objective is to emphasize the externality caused by the
penalty and the consequences of court decisions on social welfare. We show how minimum and
maximum sentences, for a given crime, can be used efﬁciently to reduce the gap between the
optimal choices of society and its courts.
Another branch of literature has been widely concerned about the optimal magnitude of ﬁnes and
their use relative to imprisonment. See for example Polinsky & Shavell (1979, 1984), Friedman
(1981) and Waldfogel (1995). These papers build on the fact that imprisonment being more costly
than ﬁnes, should be used only when the criminal is unable to pay. Implicitly, they focus on “white
collar crimes” such as fraud, or property crimes such as theft. In this paper, we are interested in
crimes that require other types of penalties than ﬁnes.
2The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we build a model of a simple
justice system. We characterize the optimal sentence from the perspectives of a court and society
respectively. In Section 3, we further highlight the differences between optimal choices by a court
and society, and show the importance of reasonable doubt. In Section 4, we offer the main result
on minimum and maximum sentences. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
In this section, we consider the following simple representation of a justice system. For simplicity,
we focus on one court among many in similar situations. A crime has been committed. We assume
that the seriousness of the offence can be measured by a scalar. Popular consensus has evaluated
to
￿ the extent of the offence. The crime is of a type that precludes monetary sanctions.
The police has made an investigation and identiﬁed a suspect who faces the court. In an adversary
trial, the prosecution makes its case against the accused, the defence attempts to ﬁnd weaknesses in
the prosecution’s argument, and as a result, the court1 determines the probability
￿ that the accused
is indeed guilty of the crime. This probability reﬂects the amount of resources devoted by society
to the case. We take these resources as exogenously given.
The court then chooses to condemn or not, and contingent on condemnation, the appropriate level
of the sentence



















￿ . For parsimony, sentences and offences can be measured by the
same metric and are expressed in similar units. Once an accused is found guilty and the penalty
has been ﬁxed at







￿ for the implementation of the sentence. We assume
that the social cost of the sentence is an externality for the courts. This has two implications. First,
a given court believes its impact on overall sentencing cost is nil, which as we argued before is
reasonable considering that it takes prison facilities as given. Of course, if from the perspective of
the court, sending one more person to jail has no cost consequence, it is likely, however, to matter
dearly to society. Second, the court believesitsdecision doesnot affect the decision of other courts,




￿ represent the actual offence of the accused. From the perspective of the court, two events
1In all that follows, we model the court as an entity, while actual courts are often made of a jury and a judge.
We abstract from the question of optimally dividing tasks within a tribunal since we are interested in rationalizing
constraints imposed upon both judges and juries.














￿ ). When choosing
the sentence, the court only knows the probability associated with those two events. Hence it may
turn out doing one of four more or less desirable things: condemning a culprit, condemning an
innocent, not condemning a culprit or not condemning an innocent.
Acourthaspreferencesoverthefouroutcomes. Weassumethatthesepreferencessatisfynecessary













































￿ is the ﬁrst derivative of
the function
￿ ). We make two assumptions about these preferences. First, we assume that courts
dislike gaps between the offence of the accused
￿
￿










0). For example, they
dislike sentencing to 25 years in jail someone who stole a piece of bread. Second, we assume that










































































￿ is an additional moral cost of an unjust penalty, stemming from empathy.3
It will be useful, though not necessary for the case of the court, to interpret the disutility associ-
ated with each outcome as a cost which could be expressed in monetary units. This will come
particularly handy when we build the social planner’s function.







￿ ) to a penalty






















































































































































￿ and the court is left with the
unpaid crime.4 Table 1 summarizes the disutility of the court in the four alternatives.
2These assumptions lead us to an indirect utility function consistent with Andreoni (1991). In particular the second
assumption allows for “reasonable doubt”.
3Alternatively,assuming courts haveno empathy,one can interpret
^ as thefuture cost of having agenuine criminal
outside. Indeed, by closing the case, the court has stopped all investigations on that case with the undesirable effect
that the real culprit remains unbothered and may recidivate.
4Note that with this formulation there is no extra moral cost of not condemning a culprit. In other words, there is
no special satisfaction from social revenge.




































































































































































































￿ the optimal penalty from the perspectiveof an unconstrained tribunal.
￿
￿
￿ has the following
unsurprising features: It ﬁts the crime only in the case of perfect information on the guilt of the
accused. As the probability of guilt goes to 1,
￿
￿ goes to
￿ . More serious crimes require more
severe penalties, and the risk of convicting an innocent tempers the court. Proposition 1 provides
a more thorough characterization:
Proposition 1 (court’s behavior)






































￿ is increasing in
￿ and in the probability of guilt
￿ , while it is decreasing in the moral cost
H of sentencing an innocent.













￿ is a direct application of the implicit function theorem. For the remainder



















As the court, society is concerned about the case of the accused. But it is also concerned with the
management of the sentence chosen by the court. If the cost of carrying through the sentence is
an externality for the court, it ought to be taken into account in the search for the social optimum.
Consequently, the costs to society in the four alternatives differ from the costs to a given court. In
Table 2, for example, the cost to society of condemning an innocent is higher than the cost to the













H which, since the accused is innocent leaves it with the




H . Society bears the same disutility,but is left with yet another cost,







￿ . This cost has to be borne in all cases where a conviction of
level







￿ is positive, monotone, increasing and convex.5


















































Society’s objective is to minimize the social cost associated with the judgment. This means com-
paring the cost of condemning
￿









































































































￿ the socially optimal penalty.
5From Table 2, we see why it is important to view the disutility of the different outcomes as a cost. It allows us to
relate the social cost of imprisonment to the disutility of sentencing.
















p , the socially optimal penalty
￿








￿ is increasing in
￿ and in
￿ , and decreasing in
H .
Again the proof of this proposition is straightforward. Because of the social cost of implementing
the sentence, society would prefer a penalty that never ﬁts the crime. Society only agrees with the
court in the case of unquestionable innocence. In other words, society’s goal, is not perfectly met


















3 Society vs court
In a world of imperfect information on the guilt of the accused, the impact of the externality is
most important. Proposition 3 characterizes the differences in the choices of the court and society.








































































Proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix. Its message is two-fold: First, the court
condemns “at least as often” as society. Indeed, if the court ﬁnds it optimal not to condemn the
defendant, so does society. If society ﬁnds it optimal to condemn, so does the court. The converse,
however, is not true. In other words, if one is quicker to convict, such is the court. Second, the
penalty imposed by the court upon conviction is higher than the penalty socially desirable. All in
all, society’s optimal penalty is always smaller than the court’s, and the court convicts at least as
often as society would.










￿ the probabilities of guilt that make the tribunal and society respectively
indifferent between condemning and not condemning.














































￿ havea natural interpretation in the notion
of reasonable doubt. If there is a moral cost
H of condemning an innocent, then for the court to







￿ that the accused is guilty. Society is
more stringent than the court on the reasonable doubt requirement. To put it simply, the court and
society in our model do not agree on what constitutes a reasonable doubt.











￿ implies that there is a natural
minimum sentence for the court as well as for society. We illustrate this geometrically for the court














































































































































































￿ , which, from the envelope
theorem, is decreasing in









￿ represents the disutility of the court upon dismissal
of the case. Since the court attempts to minimize the disutility of its decision, we can immediately













































































￿ . This means that if it had found the defendant guilty, the
court would have been ready to impose a positive sentence. The disutility of actually convicting
the accused, however, is too high, which results in a non-guilty verdict. Hence, the court considers
that the defendant deserves a sentence but it is not willing to assign it to him. This could be
interpreted as sentencing with remission. The court does not want to condemn to sentences that














￿ . Hence for a given crime, there


















8exists a “natural” minimum sentence self-imposed by the court. The key to understanding why this
is so lies again in
H , i.e. the moral cost of possibly condemning an innocent. When the probability
of guilt is small, the risk of convicting an innocent is relatively large. Consequently the disutility
of condemning is bigger than the disutility of not condemning. If
H were nil, the court would be
willing to impose arbitrarily small sentences for arbitrarily small evidence of guilt.7
Figure 2 summarizes the differences between the behaviors of society and the court. Note that
except for the linearity, Figure 2 is fully general. Hence we will make use of this picture hereafter
to illustrate the more general case.
4 Minimum and Maximum Sentences
If the court is unconstrained in its choice of
￿ , for every level of















￿ measures the gap between court’s actions and society’s desires. Naturally, since
￿ is not
observable ex ante, the point-wise loss is not a good measure. Instead, we must revert to expected








￿ denote the relative frequency by which an accused exhibits the probability
￿ of being
guilty for given police resources and crime type. We can view
· as a probability distribution over
￿ . If
















￿ would represent an adequate
measure of the welfare loss. For parsimony, but without loss of generality, we will work with a
uniform distribution, so that we can use geometric arguments. It is easy to generalize the results
to any reasonable distribution.8 Speciﬁcally, the welfare loss can be represented within a ﬁgure
similar to Figure 2 with some distortion.
We now examine the following question: Could society constrain court behavior in such a way that
it would reduce the welfare loss of delegating? What instruments are available to society? Since
society delegates the choice of the verdict to the court, society does not observe
￿ and cannot force
7Clearly, the natural minimum sentence is an artifact of our model. It arises from the assumption that
^ is ﬁxed.
This assumption is not unrealistic considering that there is a ﬁxed component to sentences: the shame that hits an
accused for spending even one night in jail. Because of this ﬁxed component, a court in reality could not assign
arbitrarily small penalties even if it wanted to.
8Of course, the uniform distribution, though useful, is by no means reasonable, since it suggests that the police
selected the accused randomly. By reasonable, we mean an upward-sloping distribution. Hence, the higher
_ the
higher the number of accused of that type.
9the court to reveal its actual value.9 Hence society can only restrict court behavior by imposing
limits to sentences.
In Figure 3 we show that imposing a maximum sentence
￿
￿
￿ would reduce the welfare loss. For



























￿ is the best maximum sentence that we can design. In fact, the optimal
maximum sentence is strictly lower than this one, as we will show below.
Could minimum sentences help? A minimum sentence such as
￿
f
” in Figure 3 has two different
effects. First, it pushes further the conviction threshold of the court. The latter will indeed require a
















￿ . Second, the minimum sentence
imposes a social cost stemming from the fact that some accused will now be sentenced to a higher
pain than desired by the court, which was already too high from the point of view of society. This















the optimal maximum and minimum sentences. We now introduce our most
important result: it is indeed in society’s interest to set upper and lower limits to sanctions. The
upper-bound ought to be small, and the lower-bound high in the following sense:
Proposition 5 (Limits to sentences)











































The intuition for the proof goes as follows. That there exists a welfare improving maximum sen-









￿ is one such maximum sentence. That the same holds for a
minimum sentence can be established using the following argument: suppose we impose a mini-
mum sentence
￿























9One could think of solving a mechanism design problem whereby the court would be asked to make a report on
_ . However, to induce truthful revelation, such a mechanism requires side payments, which, for obvious reasons, are





































¿ converging to 0. Hence, the welfare loss converges to zero faster





















￿ holds, note that the welfare










￿ exceeds the welfare loss








• , whereas the welfare loss is measured by a triangle of smaller base and same
height.
These results are striking for the following reasons. First, a society wishing to refrain its courts
from being too harsh on criminals, would ﬁnd optimal to set high minimum penalties. It would do
so, not to increase severity, but rather to decrease the rate of convictions. The response of courts in
our model, will indeed be a reduction in this rate of convictions.
Historicalexamplesof suchresponsesofcourtstohighminimumpenaltiesaredescribedbyBeattie
(1974). In 17th and 18th centuries England, the number of crimes punishable by death was on
the rise. By the end of this period, about 200 offences, many of them minor property crimes,
were by law assigned the death penalty. As the criminal code became harsher, Beattie (1974)
shows evidence of “an increasing tendency over the period for prosecutors and the courts alike
deliberatelytounderstatethenatureofthecrimeinordertosavetheaccusedfromthegallows,”10 or
tosimplydismiss casesforwhichthedeathpenaltywas perceivedbythecourttobe excessive. This
last effect was reinforced by another one, directly coming from the victims whose dislike for the
death penalty made them more reluctant to prosecute offenders. Hay (1975) reports contemporary
opinion that “the gibbets and corpses paradoxically weakened the enforcement of the law: rather
than terrifying criminals, the death penalty terriﬁed prosecutors and juries, who feared committing
judicial murder on the capital statutes.”11 In essence, the extremely severe minimum penalty in
this era had all potential to make it easier for criminals. According to DiIulio (1996), a similar
reaction of courts to high minimum penalties took place recently in the United States after “three
strikes” laws were passed in some states. These laws were designed to discourage repeat offences:
upon third conviction, a felon was to be sentenced to life behind bars. DiIulio (1996) suggests that
courts started to ﬁnd ways of avoiding such drastic conclusion. Clearly, both these examples are
extreme cases of minimum penalties and far exceed the minimum penalties we advocate in this
paper.12 Yet, they illustrate the mechanism by which minimum penalties may affect the behavior
10Beattie (1974), page 83.
11Hay (1975), page 23.
12Though Hay (1975) argues that the use of capital punishment in England and the reaction of courts might have
11of courts.
A second striking aspect of our result is that to achieveits goals, at the risk of seeming inconsistent,
society would also ﬁnd optimal to set low maximum penalties. This time, it is not the rate of con-
victions, which it would target, but rather the size of the penalty courts would assign to defendants
found guilty.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that minimum and maximum penalties may be used optimally to reduce the
rate of convictions and the magnitude of sentences. Our theory is based on the assumption that the
cost of implementing a sentence is an externality to courts. As a result, the latter are inclined to be
more severe than is socially optimal. A mix of high minimum penalties and low maximum ones is
shown to align courts with societal goals.
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12Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3





















































































































































































































































































￿ does not solve the court’s problem. Given the strict convexity of


















































































￿ , which is satisﬁed for any
_ .
































































































j by showing that at
_
￿
˘ society would not condemn the defendant. This follows















































































































































































































Figure 1: On reasonable doubt
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Figure 2: Optimal sentences, society vs court
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Figure 3: On the use of limits to sentences
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